Institutions-defined as laws, policies, and strategies-are the backbone of the delivery of effective social safety nets. Often understood or defined as the rules of the game, institutions will need to evolve in several dimen
Institutions-defi ned as laws, policies, and strategies-shape human behavior and human interaction and are therefore central to the delivery of social safety nets. Oft en understood or defi ned as the rules of the game, institutions shape all aspects of social safety nets, ranging from establishing the benefi t eligibility criteria to the rules that govern the organization that delivers the social safety net program (including its mandate and human resource policies) and the laws that govern the sector (box 4.1). Beyond the formal rules, informal institutions-routines, conventions, and customary practices-infl uence the provision of social safety nets in diverse ways, from mediating notions of deservingness to encourage public support among populations to incentivizing civil servants and frontline staff to deliver programs.
If the social safety nets in Africa are to be expanded to the required scale, governments must make serious investments in strong institutions. Th e institutions supporting the social safety nets in Africa are evolving as programs are launched, deliver benefi ts, and become an everyday part of the political and social landscape. Th ese processes can take considerable time and are infl uenced by many factors, including political and fi scal aspects (chapters 3 and 5). More immediately, if the social safety nets are to be brought to scale, institutions that support their operation and help build their legitimacy are required. Th ese institutions may be of many types, embody international best practices or homegrown solutions, and entail both formal and informal rules. Th ese rules of the game will also evolve because they refl ect changing behaviors, beliefs, and power relations within countries.
Th e institutional anchors of social safety nets must be strong, credible, and produce results. Th e anchoring institutions must fulfi ll the following three functions if social safety nets are to become sustainable at scale: (1) commitment, that is, the assurance that policies will remain consistent beyond the political cycle; (2) coordination, the ability to convince numerous actors to take coordinated action in pursuit of a common good; and (3) cooperation, the ability to prevent free riding or to convince actors to take steps they may consider in their interest (World Bank 2017) . Th is chapter explores these aspects of a strong institutional anchoring for social safety nets by considering the policy and legislative context and the organizations that oversee, coordinate, manage, and implement social safety net programs in Africa.
Th ere are multiple paths in the evolution of the rules of the game for social safety nets in Africa, and many are linked to the development of broader social protection systems. Building a social protection system does not necessarily mean focusing on a single entity or agency to manage multiple programs (Robalino, Rawlings, and Walker. 2012) . Indeed, Mathauer (2004) explains that, given the multidimensional nature of poverty, social safety nets are naturally multisectoral, thereby requiring the coordination and management of interorganizational and intergovernmental relations. Similarly, by design, social safety nets require a plurality of providers comprising public (local, regional, and national), private, and voluntary agencies. Finally, the decentralized nature of service delivery interplays with the decentralization process and the nature of communities and their structures.
Countries follow diff erent paths in this process, and progress along one parameter is neither a precondition for progress along another parameter nor suffi cient in itself (table 4.1) . In some countries, such as Ethiopia, the development of a social protection policy took place aft er signifi cant consolidation of social safety net programs and the achievement of near nationwide coverage. In other countries, such as Niger and Sierra Leone, the development of social protection policies took place quite early in the evolution of social safety nets and encouraged the implementation of small pilot programs. Figure 4 .1 provides a snapshot of these elements across Africa. In Latin America, the need for greater coordination among a growing number of social programs encouraged governments to bring these into a coherent social safety net system, usually guided by a social protection policy. By contrast, the formalization of social safety nets through politics and laws can be counterproductive if these are introduced while space for experimentation is still required to build political support or to gain experience with the delivery of diff erent design features. Th e necessary space may exist within institutions that operate outside governments. Indeed, creating policies and laws through technically driven processes, oft en with the support of development partners, can delink these policies and laws from national social norms or political processes and produce inadequate frameworks (Bridges 2016) . Despite these various paths, a common feature across countries is the search for institutions that deliver commitment, coordination, and cooperation.
Th is chapter illustrates the critical role of institutions in bringing social safety nets to scale in Africa. It builds on a desk review of program documents and a series of country case studies for a discussion of four main areas, as follows (box 4.2):
• First, the chapter considers the laws, policies, and strategies that are increasingly being deployed to anchor social safety nets in Africa. It reviews the progress in establishing these frameworks, while emphasizing that more eff orts are required if these policies, strategies, and laws are to become rooted in national policy making and supported by political will and fi nancing. Th e policies, strategies, and laws must remain consistent, thereby providing the committed foundation required by well-functioning institutions.
• Second, the chapter discusses the options for selecting organizations to be responsible for the oversight, coordination, and management of social safety nets. A successful selection will result from a balance between the mandates of the organization and the organization's access to political p l a n s I n p r o g r e s s I n p l a c e N o t P r e s e n t I n p r o g r e s s P r e s e n t
S o c i a l m i n i s t r y C e n t r a l i n s t i t u t i o n O t h e r s e c t o r a l m i n i s t r y
O t h e r a r r a n g e m e n t s N o t p l a n n e d P l a n n e d 
Social registry status
Measures to deal with crises
Development partner involvement
Number of countries authority. The initial selections are important because incentives and norms within the responsible organizations will shape the development of social safety nets within a country. For social safety nets, the selections are central to establishing institutions that have the ability to ensure coordination and cooperation across the relevant sectors, thereby encouraging the commitment of organizations to achieving policy objectives.
• Th ird, the chapter considers the elements that determine the eff ectiveness of organizations in managing, coordinating, and delivering social safety nets. It shows how various management arrangements can create incentives for organizations to achieve program objectives. It considers how programs may span multiple ministries and agencies and the eff ects of decentralization or deconcentration on the functioning of these organizations.
• Fourth, the chapter offers reflections on how organizational structures incentivize or constrain staff. It highlights that, as social safety nets become embedded in national systems, the dynamics of civil service participation will come to the fore, with important implications for the commitment and the ability of staff to ensure coordination and cooperation.
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Methodology and Case Study Selection
The chapter analyzes the role of social safety net institutions through a review of program documentation in 31 African countries, 16 country case studies, and 8 special country case studies on the legal framework. The case studies were selected to represent a spectrum of contexts, stages of development and expansion of social safety nets, legal frameworks, and historical institutional heritage across Africa.
The countries span from Chad and Mauritania, which, until recently, had limited social safety net programs, to Ethiopia and South Africa, which have more deeprooted programs. The countries range from the large (Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa) and the small (Sierra Leone), to francophone (Côte d'Ivoire, the Republic of Congo, Senegal), lusophone (Mozambique), and anglophone (Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia).
The chapter also draws on examples of programs in countries in other regionssuch as Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, and Pakistan-to benchmark and compare with the trends in Africa and benefi t from a wider body of knowledge and research on institutions and public sector management.
From Frameworks to Commitments: Emerging National Strategies for Social Safety Nets
Across the region, governments are now focusing on creating an institutional framework to advance social safety nets. In addition to establishing the formal rules of implementation for individual programs, many governments are identifying the wider policy context for social safety nets, oft en within a broader framework for social protection. Because, according to the World Bank (2017, 171) , "eff ective policies tend to have long-term objectives (extending beyond the political cycle), matching resources and well-aligned incentives for the actors involved, " the elaboration of these policies or strategies can contribute to fostering political interest and support for social safety nets.
1 Oft en, the policy commitments are embedded in international conventions and declarations, attesting to the layering of institutions across local, national, and international activity spaces (Mehta et al. 1999) . While the presence of these policies, laws, and legal frameworks signals an important step forward toward the establishment of a stable anchor for social safety nets in Africa, the legitimacy of these formal institutions rests on whether they will be enforced, which is a function of support for them politically and the will to implement them (World Bank 2017).
Laws, policies, and strategies are largely formal, but informal rules are critical to ensuring credibility. Informal elements "can undermine, reinforce, or even substitute for the functioning of formal institutions" (Left wich and Sen 2010, 25) . Th is interplay between formal and informal rules implies that setting up formal institutions is more than a technical exercise focused on getting the laws right. It requires understanding the politics of social safety nets, including how policies, strategies, and laws refl ect or change cultural understandings of poverty and entitlements (chapter 3). Th e alignment of formal and informal rules creates the belief that laws and policies will be enforced. Th e focus here is on the evolution of the formal rules for social safety nets.
Across many countries in Africa, international and regional commitments have provided a springboard for the mobilization of support for social safety nets among politicians and technocrats, thus infl uencing national policies on social safety nets. Most African countries are signatories of international agreements and declarations that encompass social safety nets (chapter 3). Th e Universal Declaration of Human Rights commits governments to recognizing and fulfi lling the right to social protection, which is also articulated in article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
2 Th is commitment has been translated into law through treaties, customary international law, general principles, regional agreements, and domestic law that express and guarantee human rights. Th e African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights reinforces the relevant covenants. 3 More specifi c commitments are implied in other regional and international declarations. Recommendation R202 of the International Labour Organization provides guidance on extending and adapting social protection fl oors to national circumstances. 4 Th e Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of Action (2004), the Livingstone Call for Action (2006), the Social Policy Framework for Africa (2008) , and the Yaoundé Declaration (2011) all include commitments by African governments to improve the living conditions of vulnerable people through better social protection services. 5 While soft and nonbinding, such international commitments can be evoked in securing the commitment of governments to social safety nets, an approach that has proven useful across countries in Africa in advancing social safety nets. Such international commitments can potentially build momentum at the national level for bringing social safety nets to scale (Kaltenborn et al. 2017) .
Despite the widespread adoption of international treaties across Africa, there is signifi cant variation in the degree to which social safety nets are anchored in national legislation-at times as part of a broader position on social protection (table 4. 2). Constitutions have recognized the right to social safety nets in some countries, while the constitutions in others off er general provisions for basic rights or the protection of vulnerable groups. Th e Constitution of Kenya stipulates the "right for every person . . . to social security and binds the State to provide appropriate social security to individuals who are unable to support themselves and their dependents." In Niger, the Constitution explains that everyone "has the right to life, to health, to physical and moral integrity, to a healthy and suffi cient food supply, to potable water, to education and instruction in the conditions specifi ed by the law;" and "the State sees to the elderly through a policy of social protection. " In Rwanda, "Th e State shall, within the limits of its capacity, take special measures for the welfare of survivors of genocide who were rendered destitute by genocide committed in Rwanda from October 1, 1990 to December 31st, 1994 , the disabled, the indigent, and the elderly as well as other vulnerable groups. " 6 Embedding social safety nets in national development strategies or plans is an opportunity to create cross-sectoral synergies in order to improve well-being (Carroll 2011) .
Social protection policies and strategies have become common among Africa countries, but they are oft en quite general, which may undermine their credibility. Among the 48 countries in the region, 39 have approved or are in the process of draft ing such policies (see chapter 1, table 1.1, appendix table D.1). In most counties, the strategies or policies are quite recent. Except for South Africa (1997), they date from 2005 or later (fi gure 4.2). Th ey typically present the overarching principles that govern social safety net programs nationwide. Th ese set out a vision for programs, the main target groups, and the types of benefi ts. Th ese are agreed upon across various government agencies and development partners. While national strategies and policies make important statements about a government's ambitions, the generic nature of the provisions, which also tend to be quite ambitious in prevailing contexts, may inadvertently undermine the credibility of these strategies. General statements may be reinterpreted or redefi ned, thereby opening up the possibility for these policies and strategies to be altered during each political cycle; and even if policy aims are sustained, generic provisions may be diffi cult to enforce and thus deliver. Th e broad, general nature of national policies and strategies may partly derive from the infl uence of development partners. Th is infl uence results in strategies that do not necessarily refl ect the political priorities of the government, but rather a tendency toward the application of international best practice (Bridges and Woolcock 2017; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2015) . In countries in which the development of social safety net strategies has been supported by development partners-such as the Republic of Congo, Mauritania, and Uganda-these generally outline an overall vision of social protection and list programs by target population groups, but do not indicate how these should be prioritized or operationalized. Commonalities among policies and strategies across countries may refl ect a broader trend among development partners toward promoting the adoption of external policies and programs that have been deemed to work elsewhere. (Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2013 set out a critique of this approach.) Others have explained that this approach has arisen from external pressures, which result in countries adopting "the visible trappings of reform . . . without actually implementing them to achieve their intended function" (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2015, 224 , who also cite Krause 2013) .
In establishing policy objectives, most governments are reluctant to use the terminology of entitlements for social safety nets. Th e governments of Cameroon and Uganda, for instance, expressed concern about creating a legal entitlement to social safety nets that they may fi nd diffi cult to realize. 7 Identifying the commitment to social safety nets with entitlements introduces the means to enforce the policies, which strengthens the credibility of the programs. Except for Botswana, Mozambique, and South Africa, social safety net programs in the countries reviewed are based largely on strategies or operational manuals without legal authority (see table 4.2) . Th us, even if benefi ts are clearly listed and grievance procedures are described in such documents, the lack of legislation means they are not legally enforceable. Th is implies that there is no legal obligation to address complaints that arise if the programs are not delivered as intended. Th e introduction of legal frameworks for social safety nets can assure greater commitment to the sector, but only if the frameworks build policy objectives that are widely supported (World Bank 2017). For instance, in 2012, the Kenyan Parliament passed a private member's social assistance bill. However, the resulting Act was informed neither by the benefi ts or the targeting criteria of existing social safety net programs, nor by existing or planned institutional arrangements. Th us, the Act was not enforceable because the government's social safety nets could not deliver on the objectives of the policy, and the policy did not refl ect the aims of the ministers responsible for social safety nets. To correct this, the ministry responsible for social protection is currently trying to codify existing social assistance provisions into law, but will need to repeal the 2012 Act before passing a new bill, a more complex and time-consuming process than passing a bill for the fi rst time. Meanwhile, the existing bill has created a misunderstanding. Potential benefi ciaries of existing social safety net programs are unable to understand the rationing and poverty targeting that are part of the eligibility assessment process.
Legal frameworks for social safety nets can generate sustained political commitment to delivery on their objectives if they are enforced. South Africa off ers an example of how political incentives are aligned with a legal framework for social safety nets, thereby resulting in credible enforcement of the laws. Th ere, the Constitution includes a Bill of Rights that guarantees the right of all South Africans "to have access to social security, including if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents" (Black Sash 2010, 2) . Th is right has been formally recognized in the Social Assistance Act of 2004, which defi nes eligibility criteria and other parameters of the social grant system. Th e ability to realize these entitlements derives from the Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals, which allows citizens to mount a legal challenge if they believe they have been denied benefi ts to which they feel entitled or if they feel they have been treated unfairly by the South African Social Security Agency. Such examples are rare in Africa, however. Other means of enforcing commitments to social safety nets are apparent in Africa, where there are examples of political commitments that have been translated into increased budgetary allocations and enhanced capacity to deliver programs. In Mozambique, the development of an appropriate legislative framework has been key to establishing social safety nets. Th e Social Protection Law of 2007 and the National Strategy for Basic Social Security in 2009 resulted in wider coverage and government fi nancing; between 2012 and 2015, budget allocations increased from 0.22 percent to 0.56 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (ILO, UNICEF, and WFP 2015) . Political and social forces can similarly incentivize the enforcement of commitments to delivering social safety nets (chapter 3).
Rooting Social Safety Nets in Organizations for Policy Setting, Oversight, Coordination, and Management
Th e organizational landscape for social safety nets in Africa has evolved as the responsibilities for policies and programs have become more fi rmly vested in government ministries. Unlike other sectors, such as health and education, few ministries were responsible for social protection or social safety nets in Africa until recently. Selecting the home for social safety nets is oft en thus a fi rst step in strengthening the institutional anchoring because these organizations are central to coordinating multiple actors toward the achievement of common objectives and ensuring compliance and decision making that support and reinforce the commitments to social safety nets, even if these decisions are not in the interests of politicians, managers, or technocrats (World Bank 2017). Th e choice typically depends on the factors that led to the emergence of social safety nets because there is no blank slate (Andrews 2013; chapter 3) . In some countries, social safety nets have emerged out of the experience with the provision of social security for formal sector workers; in others, they have emerged out of a concern for food insecurity or vulnerability to disasters. Typically, this origin leads governments to build social safety net programs within sectoral ministries or on the foundations of existing programs. Th is is critical to success because organizations are more likely to be successful if they "identify, tap into, and build on preexisting capacity" (Barma, Huybens, and Viñuela 2014, 5).
Choice of Home for Policy Setting, Oversight, and Coordination Balances Mandates and Political Power
Organizations with the policy mandate for social safety nets are typically selected for their proximity to political power or for the alignment of social safety nets with their mandates. These choices point to strategies that are employed to generate legitimacy for social safety nets by lodging these programs within organizations with a mandate aligned with political interests or within organizations able to generate results-that is, organizations with the structures and the capacity to deliver the programs, including identifying eligible beneficiaries, making payments, monitoring activities, and so on. The relative importance of these factors may change. For instance, a program that emerges as a short-term response to an emergency may be located in a high-profile agency, such as the office of the president, where it may respond rapidly and with high visibility. However, as programs become more mature and become better integrated into longer-term social protection policy, a social ministry or agency with a policy mandate to serve the vulnerable may become a more appropriate home. There is a pattern between the chosen entity and the spending profile of programs. A large portion of the total social safety net financing overseen by social ministries is for cash transfer programs (44 percent), whereas when central institutions are in charge, spending is higher on public works ( figure 4.3). When other arrangements (besides a ministry or central institution) are tapped, emergency programs or food aid are the largest share of government spending. There is a trade-off inherent in the choice of agency for coordination and oversight, as illustrated in the case of Nigeria's process for establishing a social safety net coordination function (box 4.3). The category of social ministry includes organizations that are responsible for social assistance (including social affairs, social welfare, social protection, social cohesion, social action, human rights), employment (or labor), health, women (or gender), children and families, among others. The category of central institution includes organizations that play a central role in government, including offices of the president or prime minister, as well as ministries responsible for the economy, planning, and the budget or finance, depending on the country. The category of other sectoral ministry includes organizations that do not have a social mandate, including ministries responsible for local government, decentralization, local development, rural development, agriculture, forestry, transportation, and urban development, among others. Most often, these are ministries. The category called other arrangements includes situations when multiple ministries hold responsibility for policy setting, oversight, and coordination; or situations when responsibilities is given to an autonomous government agency or a nongovernmental organization. Typologies are described in appendix A, methodology in appendix B, and more details in appendix G, table G.6. Responsibility for policy setting, oversight, and coordination is oft en housed in organizations with a mandate to support vulnerable populations. Across the sample, this responsibility is vested in a social organization in 22 of 38 countries reviewed; social ministries might include ministries of social action or aff airs, labor; women, family and children; or social security ( fi gure 4.4) . Th e selection of a social ministry may refl ect a desire to name a ministry that is already mandated to promote policies that support the poor and vulnerable. Th e decision might be to group together aspects of the social protection or social safety net system, such as social pensions or services for children, those aff ected by disability, or those aff ected by illness, an accident, or another emergency (whereas contributory pensions are usually managed by a separate agency). However, while social ministries may have the strongest mandate to support the poor, they oft en have limited fi nancial resources and political infl uence, including limited authority to require other ministries to collaborate and to coordinate activities. Th ese factors may undermine the ability of these ministries to achieve results and point to their limited legitimacy in some contexts.
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Nigeria's Process to Establish a Coordination Function
In Nigeria, there were many questions about institutional and coordination functions and structures when the government embarked on the design of an ambitious new national social safety net program in 2015. The political economy of federalism implies a diverse landscape for potential reforms and a complex context for the implementation of national programs. While autonomy gives Nigerian states, particularly those with dynamic and progressive leadership, an opportunity to move ahead on their own, it also poses a challenge for building a national consensus across the various levels of government.
In developing a coordination function, the government of Nigeria refl ected upon analyses of institutional arrangements that were focused on institutional forms and functions in countries with similar national social safety net programs, as well as the experience of countries that have established successful social safety nets. A number of functional capabilities emerged as common across programs, including convening ability, political visibility and infl uence, operational capabilities, ability to coordinate with other social programs, resilience, and transition capacity.
Using these capabilities as a guide, Nigerian agencies that could potentially house a national social safety net program were identifi ed. Attention was paid to the implications of the Nigerian federal system, including the decentralization of roles and responsibilities among states. Several roundtable discussions were held with key government stakeholders and development partners. The government decided to house the main body for social safety net coordination and delivery in the Offi ce of the President. In many countries, central organizations are selected because they tend to have greater political infl uence through their proximity to powerful decision makers. Central organizations-the offi ce of the prime minister, the offi ce of the president, or ministries of fi nance and planning-are responsible for policy making and coordination in 10 of the 38 countries surveyed. While these organizations may enjoy considerable authority and oft en special procedures that allow them to act more swift ly than technical ministries, the organizational culture may be less sympathetic to the need of the vulnerable for social transfers. Th e focus in these organizations is generally on economic growth and expanding employment and productivity, while households that are in the most need of social safety net support tend to face the biggest challenges in gaining access to productive employment.
Locus of Program Management Refl ects Organizational Mandates
Th e responsibility for the management and implementation of social safety net interventions is frequently housed in a diff erent organization from that which oversees policy initiatives. Of the programs presented in table 4.3 (organized by type of organization responsible for policy, oversight, or coordination), about half are managed in the same agency that undertakes policy, coordination, and oversight. In Ethiopia, the Ministry of Labor and Social Aff airs led the development of the national policy and is mandated to carry out coordination and oversight functions. But the largest program, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), is managed by the Food Security Coordination Directorate in the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In countries where social safety net programs are nascent, as in Chad, some programs are typically managed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and involve only limited government participation.
Generally, the management of social safety net programs is vested in ministries with a mandate that aligns with the aims of the program. Th us, social safety net programs with a protective focus, such as unconditional transfers to categorical groups considered vulnerable, tend to be housed in social ministries. Th is is the case of social safety net programs in Kenya (the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children [OVC] Program, the cash transfer for the elderly, and the case transfer for people with severe disabilities), the Child Support Grant in South Africa, and social pensions in Uganda and Zanzibar. Programs that focus more on productive aspects may be more frequently housed in ministries of rural development, agriculture, roads, infrastructure, or water. One of Ghana's fl agship social safety net programs, the LaborIntensive Public Works Program, is managed by Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. In Lesotho, the Public Works Program is managed by the Ministry of Forestry. In many countries, there are multiple social safety net programs and multiple ministries or agencies responsible for implementation.
In regions with a longer tradition of social safety net programs, the institutional arrangements oft en evolve. While programs are relatively new in Africa, and few have changed organizational home, experience in other regions shows that arrangements may alter. In Colombia, the conditional cash transfer program Familias en Acción was launched in the late 1990s as part of the Social Support Network created to off set the impact on poor households of a severe economic crisis. It was initially set to last three years and, in line with this short-term emergency mandate, was operated by Acción Social. As the crisis subsided, the original emergency role became obsolete, and programs were refocused more broadly on the promotion of human capital. Th e initial arrangements had allowed for rapid implementation because the operating rules were less constraining, but this had also resulted in isolating Familias en Acción from other, prevailing social organizations and coordination mechanisms. To establish links to other organizations and contribute to the broader human capital development strategy, the program began to be used as a liaison between service providers and the benefi ciaries-the poorest households. Th is evolution, from emergency initiative to part of a broader social policy, required shift s in organizational arrangements. In 2011, the Departamento Administrativo de Prosperidad Social (Ministry for Social Prosperity) was created and took over the responsibility for management from the Offi ce of the President. Today, Familias en Acción reaches over 2.5 million households, about a quarter of the population, and is strongly anchored in national legislation. 
Early Choice of Organizational Home Can Shape the Evolution of Social Safety Nets
Th e choice of ministerial home shapes the evolution of the social safety net program, as diff erent organizations-and the people who staff them-tend to focus on diff erent outcomes. Programs tend to conform to the vision and mandate of the responsible organization. Th is occurs through the formal and informal rules that govern organizations. Social workers in a social ministry will focus on the specifi c needs of vulnerable groups-a refl ection of their professional mandate and priorities, as well as their professional "customs" and views. Th is will aff ect how the program design evolves, with the possible inclusion of other vulnerable groups or extension of the program to other services required by these groups. Stakeholders and organizations involved in public works programs may have a diff erent outlook, being more concerned about the contribution of programs to economic growth and graduation out of poverty than inclusion. Th e skills, interests, and incentives for the staff of these ministriesand the political will that backs these ministries-will prioritize those aspects of these programs that achieve the stated (or unstated) objectives. Experience from Kenya and Ethiopia, which is described below, shows how the choice of implementing ministry-and the diff erent founding philosophy that leads to this choice-results in diff erent implementation approaches and diff erent results being achieved, which, in turn, lead to diff erent trajectories. In Kenya, the cash transfer for orphans and vulnerable children was launched in response to the growing number of children in households aff ected by HIV/ AIDS. Th e government was keen to explore options that would provide support to orphans, while avoiding expansion in orphanages. Th e provision of cash transfers was expected to enable households to continue to care for orphans and vulnerable children. Responsibility was given to the unit responsible for the care of orphans, the Department of Children's Services, which is also supported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), which played a key role in the pilot initiative. Th e early successes of the program infl uenced the Department of Social Development to pilot the cash transfer program for older persons, and for persons with severe disabilities. Th ese pilots also gained political support, and overall coverage of these programs reached about 765,000 households in 2017. A similar trajectory is seen in Ghana.
In contrast, the PSNP in Ethiopia was initiated in response to chronic food insecurity. It was viewed as part of an overall food security strategy (associated with the launch of other resettlement and food security programs) and thus fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Th us, the productive contribution of the program through the public works (such as investments in soil and water conservation) have been emphasized, with management of the works shift ing to the Natural Resource Management Directorate of the Ministry, together with the ability of the social safety net transfers, when combined with livelihood support, to graduate people out of food insecurity. Yet, as the national social protection policy gained traction, the Ministry of Labor and Social Aff airs was given the mandate to manage the aspect of the PSNP that supports those households that have no able-bodied adults and are thus unable to participate in public works.
Organizational Fragmentation Results from Multiple Views of Social Safety Nets
In some countries, there may be multiple views on the role of social safety nets, which reflect differing objectives, social norms, or political aims across countries (chapter 3). There may be a diversity of views within government, across development partners, and among other stakeholders on how social safety nets should be designed and operate. The existence of competing narratives enables different approaches to be tested, which can help identify the approach attracting the greatest political support and exerting the greatest impact, both of which are critical to expansion. But multiple approaches can also result in multiple fragmented institutions. In particular, best practice and the diverging preferences of development partners can lead to fragmentation. In Tanzania and Uganda, the coexistence of multiple narratives has led to the development of distinct programs, all providing transfers, but with different approaches and housed in different institutions (box 4.4).
Eff ective Coordination Requires Clear Mandates, Objectives, and Resources
A common feature of social protection policies is that the objectives span multiple sectors and therefore require interministerial collaboration. As such, social protection policies often include the creation of interministerial oversight bodies. These bodies are often chaired by ministers or cabinet secretaries in ministries with lower levels of decision-making and convening power or by ministers in central ministries with competing demands on time. Hence, forming such bodies or calling meetings once they are formed is rarely prioritized. For instance, in Burkina Faso, the intersectoral national council for social protection only meets once or twice a year, and mainly focuses on information sharing, whereby the main output is a list of programs and the resources spent. This lack of prioritization also arises because there are frequently no clear, time-bound outcomes that such committees are expected to produce. Instead, the stated roles include providing oversight, offering guidance, or ensuring integration. In contrast, successful coordination has involved leadership groups that are assigned specific output goals.
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Contrasting Social Safety Net Narratives in Tanzania and Uganda Uganda Social safety nets have not yet gained a substantial foothold in Uganda. Two development partners-the UK Department for International Development and the World Bank-have joined with different government ministries on programs refl ecting two approaches. Through the Expanding Social Protection Program, the former is providing support to the Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development. Although this ministry is considered to have limited implementation capacity, it is identifi ed in the social protection policy as the entity responsible for spearheading social protection. Investing in this entity is an appropriate long-term approach. The UK department's preference for unconditional cash transfers also informed the decision.
World Bank support for social safety nets is channeled through a third phase of the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, which is managed by the Offi ce of the Prime Minister. This phase will scale up public works. The World Bank's choice builds on an existing relationship and may help in promoting the government's commitment to social safety nets. Operational capacity has not been a signifi cant consideration because district governments are responsible for most of the implementation.
Tanzania
In Tanzania in 2011, the World Bank was supporting pilot public works interventions and conditional cash transfers through the TASAF Tanzania Social Action Fund (under the Offi ce of the President), while other actors were supporting unconditional categorical transfers, including the Kwa Wazee Pension Program, in which the main partner was the Ministry of Labour and Employment.
In 2012, the government reoriented the social action fund into the Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN), which provides a combination of unconditional cash transfers, conditional supplements linked to health care and education services, public works, and livelihood support. The PSSN has become a national program and operates in all districts. The fund's unrivaled capacity and the World Bank's relationship with the Offi ce of the President have contributed to the decision to retain the institutional arrangements from earlier phases of the fund, despite the forthcoming social protection framework, which identifi es the Ministry of Labour and Employment as the lead oversight agency in social protection.
Even after the launch of the PSSN, many stakeholders retained a strong interest in social pensions, including several NGOs and the United Nations Children's Fund. In 2016, the semiautonomous region of Zanzibar launched the Zanzibar Universal Pension Scheme, a social pension program to address poverty and vulnerability among the elderly who lacked formal pensions. The program is managed by the Zanzibar Ministry of Labour, Empowerment, Elderly, Youth, Women, and Children.
However, social protection policies rarely establish the means by which joint oversight and interministerial collaboration can become functional. Many of the challenges described above may be attributed to the insuffi cient attention paid to identifying and reaching a consensus on the shared objectives of any coordination eff ort, the appropriate coordinating entity, and the targets of coordination. Typically, a general need for joint oversight is identifi ed, along with initiatives to establish structures without clearly identifying the purpose and, therefore, the most appropriate mechanisms to achieve all goals. Oft en no specifi c staff members from ministries are assigned to the coordination eff orts, nor are budgets allocated or objectives set out.
Ensuring That Organizations Can Effectively Implement Social Safety Net Programs
Th e Choice of Management Structure Matters for the Implementation of Programs
Across Africa, governments have put in place a variety of structures to manage and deliver social safety nets. Within the ministries selected for the management of social safety net programs, there are fi ve main categories of management units (see table 4.3) , that is, the structure within or outside the ministry that is eff ectively responsible for the daily management of programs, as follows:
• A project implementation unit (PIU): A team or unit that is created within a government organization to manage a project, the members of which are recruited or assigned for the sole purpose of managing the project and paid for by external agencies. Th is is the case for the social safety net programs in Cameroon and Uganda.
• A special-purpose department: A department that is established within a government organization with the specifi c mandate to manage one or several social safety net programs. An example is the Social Assistance Unit in Kenya that manages the OVC Program and cash transfers for the elderly and persons with severe disabilities.
• A preexisting department: A department within a government organization with a set mandate and range of responsibilities to which management of one or several social safety net programs is added. Th is is the case for the Lisungi cash transfer program launched in the Republic of Congo in 2013.
• A semiautonomous government agency (SAGA). A legal entity that has been created by a government to undertake specifi c functions that would have otherwise been carried out by the government. Such an entity is operationally autonomous from government. It may also be a fully autonomous agency. In Senegal, the National Agency for Social Protection and Solidarity (Délégation Nationale à la Protection Sociale et Solidarité Nationale), which reports to the Offi ce of the President, is responsible for the management of the national cash transfer program and the social registry.
• Nongovernmental institution. Th is category includes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and agencies of the United Nations. Th ese are more commonly used if capacity is limited, in fragile or humanitarian contexts, or for programs that are still small or at the pilot stage (such as in Somalia and South Sudan).
Management structures vary by context, although there is little evidence as to how these may evolve as social safety nets expand. Across a sample of programs examined, the most common form of management structure is the PIU (table 4.3). Th is is particularly the case among countries in which central ministries have vested responsibility for policy, oversight, and coordination. Th e use of PIUs also dominates if central ministries are responsible for program management. Th ey are also a common form of management arrangement in social ministries. Th e rare exception to this trend seems to occur if management responsibilities are allocated to another sectoral ministry. Th e widespread use of PIUs may refl ect the relatively recent establishment of government-managed social safety nets in many countries in Africa. Th e use of existing departments and SAGAs to manage social safety nets is the next most common type of management structure, followed by specialized departments and then NGOs.
Th e widespread use of PIUs may also refl ect the fact that many government ministries lack the operational capacity and technical skills required to manage these programs. Th is may also be a product of the importance of development partner funding in social safety net programs given that PIUs are perceived to deliver results within the time frame of project fi nancing. Lack of capacity and fi duciary concerns led to the decision to locate the Social Assistance Grants for the Empowerment Program in Uganda in PIUs. Specifi c arrangements were identifi ed to manage the relevant funds, and the PIUs relied mostly on fi xedterm contractors. In addition, PIUs off er other advantages, particularly in the short term. Th ey may attract high-caliber staff through competitive employment terms and conditions (oft en involving consultancy contracts) and may operate outside regular government fi nancial management and procurement systems. However, they are usually dependent on development partner fi nancing and may not build long-term capacity within the public sector.
8 Th e experience in other sectors suggests that, while the creation of a PIU can quickly build the capacity that is needed to deliver results, there are risks to creating such islands of effi ciency, which function well but do not respond to more systemic weaknesses within government systems. 9 Programs that are launched within separate PIUs may be migrated to regular departments within the responsible government organizations as they gain sustainability. For instance, in Indonesia, the management of the Program Keluarga Harapan was initially located within a PIU housed in the Ministry of Social Aff airs and relied largely on consultants.
To strengthen institutional sustainability, it was later moved to a directorate of the ministry, where civil servants carried out a greater range of tasks. Colombia has had a similar experience. If programs are managed by existing government structures, departments are the most common form of management unit. It also appears that the use of existing departments is somewhat more common if social ministries are responsible for social safety net programs. If programs are small and new, they may be added as an extra responsibility to a preexisting government department. Selected staff within these departments may be assigned responsibility for the program, either in addition to their existing responsibilities or exclusively. As the programs become larger or more established, a special-purpose department might be established. Such departments tend to be formed only once programs have reached a certain size and governments have made political and fi nancial commitments to ensure long-term implementation. Th is is the case in Kenya, where a social assistance unit was established to manage three programs that were initially run by existing departments within the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Development. 10 As the three programs were expanded and procedures were harmonized, the new unit was created to take over management.
SAGAs enjoy some degree of autonomy not experienced by core ministerial departments. Th ey are usually answerable to a ministry or the offi ce of the president and thus form a regular part of the government architecture, but operate under a diff erent set of rules. Th e autonomy may extend to fi nancing, personnel, or organization and may help ensure that the agency's structure and procedures refl ect its needs and function. Such managerial and fi nancial autonomy can enable the SAGA to make and enforce decisions more rapidly. SAGAs can oft en set up implementation structures that directly reach benefi ciaries, thereby bypassing the multiple levels of government administration and various decision-making processes. For example, in Sierra Leone, the National Commission for Social Action has district offi ces that directly oversee the delivery of social safety net interventions.
Although existing SAGAs may be made responsible for social safety nets, the establishment of a new SAGA usually requires greater government commitment, especially in terms of the resources and the passage of specifi c legislation needed to establish a separate agency. Th us, the establishment of a dedicated SAGA may refl ect strong political support for social safety nets. An example of a SAGA focused on a social safety net is the South African Social Security Agency, which is attached to the Ministry of Social Development. It was formed in response to perceived weak implementation by a ministerial department and decentralized government structures. The National Agency for Social Protection and Solidarity in Senegal is another example. Particularly in countries in which the social safety net program has evolved from a social fund, the responsibility for social safety nets has been allocated to existing SAGAs. In Rwanda, the Vision 2020 Umurenge Program (VUP) is run by the Local Administrative Entities Development Agency, a SAGA responsible for several rural development programs. In Sierra Leone, the social safety net is managed by the National Commission for Social Action (an autonomous government agency), which originally housed the country's social fund. Th is is also the case for Madagascar, Malawi, and Tanzania. Th ere is no evidence on whether SAGAs evolve into other entities or if SAGAs may be a preferred type of delivery agency for social safety nets in Africa.
Th e choice of management structure infl uences the eff ectiveness of the organization because these structures may incentivize or constrain management and implementation in various ways. For instance, the functioning of government departments is typically hampered by the need to abide by ministerial procedures. In particular, fi duciary procedures or hiring standards and processes are typically more restrictive among departments within government ministries than those among SAGAs or PIUs. However, allocating responsibility for a social safety net to a government department off ers the opportunity to embed the program in regular government systems, which creates management interest in and responsibility for the program. It is also a way of concretizing the views on the most appropriate types of programs without undertaking implementation. Reinforcing the mandate of a government department and strengthening its resources as needed can facilitate the grounding of social safety nets beyond the level of strategies.
Eff ective Implementation Oft en Requires Technical Coordination across Multiple Government Actors
Th e choice of management structure will also refl ect the extent to which technical coordination is required to deliver the social safety net program. Universal or unconditional programs may be associated with simpler institutional arrangements run broadly by one sectoral entity and local and national representatives. Conditional programs oft en require the engagement of multiple sectors, such as ministries of health and education, and robust procedures for collecting information from health centers and schools on the compliance of individuals with conditions. Public works programs oft en require the involvement of diverse technical staff . Th eir implementation frequently depends heavily on local governments; some programs are eff ectively devolved to local agencies. Th ey also oft en require coordination with departments involved in road, water, and natural resource management.
Th ere are many examples in Africa of practical coordination across sectors in program implementation. Th e Rwanda VUP and the Tanzania PSSN have achieved signifi cant interagency coordination, particularly at the local level. Th e eff ectiveness of the coordination structures established to implement the PSNP in Ethiopia benefi ted from the Safety Net Support Facility, which provided training and backup on leadership, understanding the terms of reference, preparing agendas, chairing meetings, dealing with nonattendance, and documenting action points. Table 4 .4 drills down into details on three large social safety net programs, in Ghana, Rwanda, and Senegal.
Technical coordination can be supported through the development of centralized tools. As social safety nets expand, the need to establish centralized tools that can serve multiple programs becomes apparent. Registries, management information systems (MISs), and shared payment mechanisms are approaches that have been applied with some success (box 4.5). Th ey help raise effi ciency and foster coordination (chapter 5). However, while these tools and the formal rules that are associated with them can improve coordination, there has been little consideration for how they may interact with the informal rules and norms that shape their use. Most immediately, the technical skills required to design and operate these tools are scarce in many African countries, and hiring suitably skilled staff can thus be diffi cult. If such staff are identifi ed, they oft en request higher salaries than those paid to civil servants, which can breed resentment.
Technical Coordination Oft en Extends Beyond Government
While policy oversight and coordination are increasingly being carried out by governments, nonstate actors are frequently involved in the delivery of social safety nets. The responsibility for certain aspects of social safety net programs is often outsourced to specialized agencies that are based in the private sector, such as payment providers or independent monitors. In many cases, NGOs and United Nations agencies provide social safety nets to hardto-reach communities or in fragile or conflict-affected areas. The management of social safety nets thus may include coordination and management of the private sector or NGOs in the effort to achieve a common purpose. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Nations Office for Project Services has become involved in carrying out labor-intensive public works for road rehabilitation. In Guinea, the World Food Programme has been conducting a school feeding initiative. In Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Niger, social safety net benefit payments are provided through microfinance institutions or money transfer agencies under contract with the agency managing the program. The Urban Safety Net Program in Ethiopia is setting up a payment system through the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. NGOs may support frontline service delivery, such registration in the case of Senegal NGOs and their networks of social workers provide much of the frontline support for the program (registration, social promotion activities, case management, and so on). The delivery of social promotion activities by deconcentrated sectoral ministries is piloted in one region. Payments are managed by the postal service and a mobile telephone company.
Decentralized government line departments support planning, implementation, and quality control in public works and assist in the Ubedehe wealth-ranking process used to target the VUP and other programs. Support for planning and implementation includes ensuring that community plans fi t with sectoral development plans, checking the adequate design of subprograms, and managing the provision of nonwage inputs into public works programs. Funds are transferred from local fi nance offi ces to savings and credit cooperatives, which make payments to benefi ciaries.
Community Community implementation committees consisting of community volunteers who identify potentially eligible households assist in household data collection for targeting and act as an information channel between the program and benefi ciaries.
Local community committees identify potentially eligible households as part of the National Unique Registry, which is used to identify PNBSF benefi ciaries.
Communities are expected to lead in the identifi cation of public works subprograms through voluntary community meetings. Communities also play key roles in the Ubedehe wealth-ranking process and the subsequent identifi cation of eligible households.
B O X 4 . 5
Tools for Coordination
In Kenya, the launch of the National Safety Net Program (NSNP) represented an attempt to coordinate four existing cash transfers: the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP) and cash transfer programs for old people, orphans and vulnerable children (the OVC Program), and people with severe disabilities. The consolidation strategy brought three of the four cash transfers under the management of a single unit, where all key functions at the national level are carried out by a single team. The staff of the fourth program participate in coordination meetings. At the local level, where the programs are implemented, the government has merged local community structures to support complaint processes and case management and is piloting a harmonized targeting approach. A shared registry of benefi ciaries has been created from the MISs of the four programs, as well as data of the Cash for Works and Food for Asset Programs of the World Food Programme. There are plans to expand this registry to additional programs so it can act as a resource for multiple programs that may adopt the harmonized targeting approach. The government of Senegal is building a registry to be used by programs that address chronic poverty and support vulnerable households. In 2012, it created a social protection agency housed in the Offi ce of the President, to lead in the formulation of a social protection strategy, the design of social safety net interventions, and coordination. As a main pillar of this effort, the government has established the Registre National Unique (unifi ed national registry), which, by 2017, included data on the 450,000 poorest households nationwide (around 30 percent of the population) (appendix D, table D.2). It already serves as an entry point for several targeted interventions, including the main conditional cash transfer program and the subsidized health insurance program, and its use is expected to expand, in particular to programs designed to respond to shocks. The registry is housed in a dedicated department, independent of the department in charge of the implementation of national cash transfer programs.
In the Republic of Congo and in Mali, the cash transfer programs have been steadily expanded since their launch in 2013, and the establishment of a unifi ed national registry has been a key part of this process (appendix D, table D.2). The development of these two national registries was undertaken while the programs were being conceived. In Mali, the creation of the Registre Social Unifi é (unifi ed social registry) began with the establishment of the Jigisemejiri Cash Transfer Program. Its objectives are to reduce costs and program coverage overlap, and to facilitate the rapid expansion of programs to respond to shocks. In the Republic of Congo, a registry was developed through the conditional cash transfer program. (see table 4.4) . Similarly, complementary services, such as behavioral change activities that target social safety net beneficiaries, are often managed by specialized United Nations agencies (such as the United Nations Children's Fund) or NGOs, as in Niger.
In fragile settings or in countries where humanitarian programs are prominent, NGOs and development partners frequently play a critical role. Indeed, the coordination and oversight of these large programs implemented outside of government are of large practical importance because of the size of the programs and the political nature of the response to shocks. In most Sahelian countries, humanitarian actors have initiated eff orts to coordinate interventions, capitalize on good practices, and engage in advocacy (box 4.6). Th ese initiatives have sometimes been formalized as alliances, such as in Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Th ey can help support government eff orts to coordinate the response to shocks.
Decentralization May Boost Flexibility and Adaptability, but Compromise Equity and Transparency
Across Africa, government decentralization is aff ecting the design, delivery, and, in some cases, the fi nancing of social safety nets. Most countries have adopted some degree of decentralization, defi ned here to include deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration occurs when decision making and management responsibilities are distributed to different entities of the central government and oft en involves shift ing responsibilities from central government offi cials to central government actors working in regions, provinces, or districts. Devolution occurs when governments transfer authority for decision making, fi nancing, and management to quasi-autonomous units of local governments, such as municipalities that elect their own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues, and exercise independent authority in investment decisions.
11 Th e argument in favor of the decentralization of services is that it distributes decision making closer to the people to increase the likelihood that the choices made by leaders refl ect the preferences of the people and encourage greater responsiveness to local concerns across a wider range of issues. Th ese is no strong evidence on the eff ects of devolution or deconcentration on the functioning of social safety nets. Two of the largest social safety net programs off er contrasting experiences.
Prospera, the conditional cash transfer program in Mexico, is centralized, while the operation of Brazil's Bolsa Família is deconcentrated to states. Th e case of South Africa off ers some insights: prior to the launch of the South Africa Social Security Agency, nine provincial governments were responsible for the implementation of seven social grants off ered by the government. Th is devolved implementation was characterized by delays in the processing of grant applications, delayed grant payments, concerns over fraud and corruption, and high B O X 4 . 6
Sahel Humanitarian Coordination for Food Security
Humanitarian actors in West Africa are seeking to create links with government programs. In particular, technical collaboration has emerged in several countries in building unifi ed national registries to identify and target households during responses to shocks.
In most Sahelian countries, humanitarian actors have initiated efforts to coordinate their interventions on food and nutrition security, capitalize on good practices, and engage in advocacy based on experiences. The nature of the efforts has depended on the country and has sometimes been formalized as an alliance, such as the Cadre Commun in Niger, Alliance Cash in Mauritania, and CORRIANS in Senegal, mainly with the fi nancial support of the ECHO Project.
To harmonize their approaches in addressing food insecurity, humanitarian actors have developed or adopted common tools. For instance, the Cadre Harmonisé (regional framework), a methodology developed by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel, CILSS) to analyze food security, is used for the early identifi cation of areas that are at risk of food insecurity and the number of people projected to be affected. Humanitarian actors also support the collection of primary data, such as through the hunger biomass map of Action Against Hunger and improvements in national early warning systems. They have likewise harmonized a household targeting methodology through a community-based approach, Household Economy Analysis (HEA), which was developed by Save the Children UK in the mid1990s. Program evaluation activities have been coordinated through a common postdistribution monitoring design (Niger) and a joint grievance mechanism (Senegal). Coordination has recently been strengthened through meetings of regional alliances (Niamey in 2015 and Dakar in 2016) .
The coordinated effort of development partners is also promoting the creation of synergies with government programs. In particular, the inclusion of development partner interventions in government-led annual food insecurity response plans has improved coordination and has also highlighted the differences in intervention methods and principles among actors. Strengthening the dialogue between humanitarian actors and governments has helped to overcome misunderstandings linked to the constraints among humanitarian actors, who are limited in their collaboration by the short funding cycle.
A technical collaboration has emerged in several countries to build national unifi ed registries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger) and use them in identifying and targeting households during responses to shocks (Mauritania, Senegal).
Source: Interviews with program experts.
administrative costs. Th e reform that led to the creation of the new central agency assigned the responsibility for the management and implementation of these grants to one administrative unit with a central offi ce and service offi ces in each province.
In most African countries, most and perhaps all programs are funded centrally, and national organizations set out key parameters and guidelines; the notable exception is NGO-implemented programs that are not overseen or managed by national governments. The delivery of the various elements of social safety nets may remain with central ministries or be deconcentrated to local staff. Typically, if implementation is carried out through a PIU, as in Burkina Faso, the delivery is centralized, and staff are recruited by the ministry to coordinate local activities. SAGAs, such as in Sierra Leone and South Africa, establish offices or recruit local staff to deliver social safety net services. In other cases, the frontline delivery of social safety nets falls to staff who report directly to local governments (devolution). In these cases, the staff-who are likely the same professional cadre as the responsible ministry, such as social workers in the case of a social ministry-are required to follow centrally established guidelines and standards. But, in a devolved context, the national organization responsible for the program does not directly manage frontline workers. These staff are accountable to local authorities. In Botswana, social workers supporting the frontline implementation of the Social Cash Transfer Program are accountable to local authorities. In such situations, local authorities recruit staff based on locally defined criteria and pay them through locally managed budgets, which may be devolved from central authorities. Often, local authorities also establish the local priorities, which may or may not include the aims and objectives of the social safety net programs.
While national, standardized guidelines exist in most programs, these oft en contain provisions for some degree of local decision making. National guidelines typically describe the various procedures to be followed in implementing program targeting, registration, payments, case management, grievance mechanisms, and exits. Th ese guidelines, however, sometimes allow local implementers in deconcentrated and devolved settings leeway in adapting programs to local conditions. Indeed, national standards enable consistent implementation, but some tasks can also benefi t from devolved decision making so programs take local realities into account. Th is fl exibility can result in more eff ective processes, such as in the context of some targeting processes, and can encourage local buy-in, thereby generating legitimacy for the program among communities and local leaders. However, it can also result in distortions or biases in the implementation of programs. In this case, local norms or practices may lead to favoritism, to the advantage of particular groups or objectives. Table 4 .5 provides examples of the variation in the delegation of selected tasks and decision Benefi ciary selection In South Africa, branches of the South African Social Security Agency review applications to assess whether households meet national eligibility criteria.
In Ethiopia's PSNP, communities make key decisions on which households are targeted in the PSNP.
Many programs-Kenya's social assistance unit, Senegal's PNBSF, and Sierra Leone's Social Safety Net Program, Burkina Faso's Burkin Nong Saya Program, Niger's Projet Filets Sociaux-use a combination of community identifi cation of potentially eligible households, a nationally applied poverty measure, and a community validation to select program benefi ciaries. They do this either themselves or by relying on national registries that combine these elements. In Benin and Cameroon, communities fi rst identify potentially eligible households, then fi nalize the selection using a national poverty measure.
Activity
Centralized Delegated Devolved (including to communities)
Public works and conditions
Rules regarding conditionality b
The conditions in most conditional programs are set nationally.
Rules regarding public works parameters c
In national programs, norms are usually set at the national level; Ethiopia's PSNP provides for reduced work norms in hot lowland areas, but these are also set at the national level.
Public works planning All public works programs allow the district or community identifi cation of public works to refl ect local needs.
Assessing adherence to conditions and public works requirements
In a number of programs (Tanzania's PSSN conditional component), monitoring and reporting on conditions are a delegated responsibility, but the calculation of deductions takes place at the national level.
Where the responsibility for payment is delegated (Tanzania's PSSN public works component and Uganda's Northern Uganda Social Action Fund 3), decisions on which household should be penalized are delegated, but this decision is expected to adhere to national standards.
Complaints and case management
Documenting complaints and benefi ciary information updates Most programs with a national MIS or a unifi ed registry have delegated responsibility to districts or communities for collecting reports on complaints or updates.
Approving benefi ciary updates and resolving complaints
Most programs with a national MIS or unifi ed registry require central authorization to resolve major complaints or update benefi ciary information.
Kenya's HSNP allows district and county staff to propose updates from within the MIS, but this still requires approval from the head offi ce.
Ethiopia's PSNP has appeals committees established within local governments and is increasingly looking to local social accountability mechanisms as a means of identifying and resolving complaints.
Source: World Bank compilation. a. In the expansion phase, the program is tending toward selecting communes based on the presence of social action offices and social workers instead of mandating that each commune be included. b. This refers to the setting of conditionalities for households, which usually is related to cash transfer programs conditioned on health care visits or education outcomes (see chapter 1, box 5.1). c. This refers to rules on working hours and other work conditions related to public works activities.
making to local structures. Local decision making may include community involvement in the identifi cation of benefi ciaries, community or district involvement in the choice of projects in public works schemes, district involvement in priority setting, and community or district decision making on the penalties for noncompletion of public works projects or failure to meet health care or education objectives. Many of the challenges associated with coordination experienced at the national level are less apparent among local implementers. Indeed, proximity facilitates communication among the staff of national institutions at the local level in the context of deconcentration. In practice, staff off er mutual support in the implementation of their respective programs.
Beyond the staff and consultants who oversee targeting, make payments, or facilitate local planning, a range of local actors oft en infl uence and shape how various aspects of a social safety net are carried out. Th e involvement of communities-oft en through local leaders or committees comprising teachers, extension workers, and representatives of youth groups-is common in Africa (see table 4.5) . Th eir involvement is most frequently seen in targeting, which enables communities to use their local knowledge to identify those people or households who meet the eligibility criteria or are considered by the community to deserve support. Th e involvement of local leaders can also lend legitimacy to these processes. In the Afar Regional State in Ethiopia, the regional government sought the participation of religious leaders in the targeting process in an eff ort to ensure that the poorest and most deserving of support were selected. Despite this, the extent to which local leaders (traditional chiefs, elders, tribal leaders) are assigned formal roles in social safety net programs varies. If such roles are not defi ned, this can create confusion as these leaders and their communities are left to play the roles appropriate to local dynamics of power.
Creating Incentives to Encourage Individual Actors to Deliver Results
Management structures and coordination mechanisms incentivize or constrain the people who oversee and deliver social safety nets. Programs may be delivered by government staff who are fully dedicated to the program or by government staff for whom social safety net activities are added to their other workloads. Th ese may be civil servants or consultants. Key functions might also be subcontracted to private sector providers, such as administering payments (contracted to post offi ces and a mobile phone company in Senegal, for instance), organizing training activities (NGOs in Senegal's PNBSF), or even running the PIU (as is the case of Chad). Government staff may work full time on a program, but social safety net activities may represent only a small part of the labor burden of district staff , and core government staff may also work alongside contract staff . Many programs make use of voluntary community structures to realize elements of program implementation, particularly local planning and benefi ciary selection. Most programs use a combination of these arrangements. Table 4 .6 highlights selected strengths and weaknesses of various approaches.
A range of other factors that incentivize or constrain staff performance are becoming increasingly important for social safety nets in Africa. Incentives can come in many forms (de Neubourg 2002) . Numerous studies have explored how low salaries, limited career advancement, and poor performance management lead to low motivation and general job dissatisfaction in the public sector. (Th ese management structures are infl uenced to varying degrees by a country's civil service or public sector management reform; see Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2015) . Th ese factors can also lead to high rates of staff turnover, generating gaps in the capacity of social safety nets in countries such as Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, and Uganda. In Sierra Leone, low remuneration rates have been identifi ed as a key constraint in attracting qualifi ed personal, as suggested by the widespread use of coping arrangements to off set the low public sector pay scale. Srivastava and Larizza (2013) identify the features of these coping arrangements as follows: (1) relatively well-paid technical assistance, oft en funded by development partners, in line positions; (2) PIUs; (3) externally funded line agencies; and, (4) other ad hoc salary increases. Interagency rivalry or competition for status or resources among government ministries can also lead to a lack of willingness to cooperate on programs, resulting in poor coordination. As social safety nets expand and are increasingly anchored in government systems, there will be a need to consider how the incentives and constrains inherent in the civil service aff ect the functioning of the program and to engage with and support broader civil service reform.
Development partner funding for social safety nets is oft en accompanied by rules and incentives with short-and long-term implications for staff motivation. Civil servants working on social safety net programs funded by development partners may have heavier workloads or be expected to perform to a higher standard than other civil servants. Yet, their remuneration oft en remains the same, guided by civil service scales and norms. Th is is frequently cited as the rationale for increases in the salaries of civil servants working on these programs, through fuel and telephone vouchers, for instance. In cases in which civil servants and hired externally funded consultants are working side, by side and interacting on a daily basis to deliver, for example, health extension services or agricultural extension services to benefi ciaries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia), competition and resentment may grow among the civil servants Unless social safety net responsibilities are carefully written into job descriptions and performance contracts, they may be neglected; they may be viewed as additional responsibilities for which staff are not remunerated; they may also overburden staff and lead to unrealistic workloads.
If an integrated approach is needed that requires the participation of frontline staff; if core activities are shared in related programs, such as benefi t schemes; if the engagement of other sectors is needed part time (responsibilities should be carefully written into job descriptions and performance contracts).
Consultants
Allows high-caliber consultants to be recruited through better pay and conditions; may facilitate a rapid surge in capacity.
May prevent capacity gaps from being structurally addressed; training and investments are provided to staff who will only work on the program for a limited duration; working relationships may be diffi cult with contract staff, who will lack authority and might be resented for their better pay and conditions.
To provide technical expertise not immediately available within the government; to work with government staff to develop skills and procedures; to provide surge capacity during periods of particularly substantial workloads.
Staff responsible for implementation coordinated among agencies
Allows different aspects of a social safety net to be delivered by the agency with the appropriate skills and procedures; facilitates links to complementary programs
The nonlead agency is likely to assign its own core activities a higher priority than social safety net implementation; may be diffi cult to establish coordination mechanisms that function as needed.
Necessary for public works programs and conditional transfer programs; however, it is important to fi nd advocates within each agency; it is also important to consider social safety net tasks in staffi ng, job descriptions, and budget allocations.
Contracting key functions to the private sector (including NGOs)
May ensure that key functions, such as payments, are carried out by organizations with appropriate skills, operating procedures, and safeguards; may allow skills and procedures not readily available in the government to be accessed, such as MIS development; may promote independence in evaluations and audits; may limit capture.
There may be a lack of private sector organizations capable of undertaking tasks; diffi culties in managing the contract as a result of poor contract management skills in the central agency; lines of accountability may be unclear, leading to confusion among benefi ciaries on how to hold service providers to account.
For the technical design of key systems (targeting, MIS, and so on); for the provision of services in which the private sector has a comparative advantage (payment services, provision of training, family support, and so on).
Use of voluntary community structures
Builds community ownership of key program procedures, such as targeting; helps ensure program responsiveness to local needs, such as planning public works projects; facilitates outreach from district headquarters.
Risk of elite capture and may affect social relationships, particularly in targeting; diffi cult to ensure consistent quality in implementation; the opportunity costs of the time spent participating in community activities and performing tasks as volunteers (may result in demands for payment).
Most programs benefi t from using volunteer community structures, but the risks need to be managed; in particular, wasting time in unnecessary meetings needs to be avoided, and the community volunteers must not be overburdened, but must be adequately supervised.
Source: World Bank compilation.
because consultants are oft en paid higher salaries. More generally, studies in West Africa show that the position of focal point in a project funded by development partners is highly sought because it provides access to islands of functionality and resources; civil servants who are not working on these externally funded projects may become apathetic toward project objectives and activities because they do not receive the same benefi ts (Olivier de Sardan 2013). Within devolved contexts, local administrative structures, priorities, and incentive systems oft en determine the motivation of locally recruited staff . In the case of devolution, if local governments manage the staff responsible for implementation, program activities must be adequately refl ected in local government plans. Th e alignment of program objectives with the objectives of the local governments can help ensure the political and managerial support of local authorities. To be eff ective, however, this alignment of aims should be translated into the detailed terms of references, work plans, and performance reviews of local staff . Even in countries such as Botswana, where the social safety net program is mature and has been fostered mainly by national stakeholders, the widespread reliance on locally hired staff has not translated into the prioritization of the roles and functions of these staff members by the local authorities who hire and pay. In Rwanda, concerns have been raised about the availability of staff to undertake the tasks associated with the social safety net program in districts because of competing priorities and a lack of clarity on the accountability for monitoring and reporting. Within a devolved setting, the knowledge, priorities, and skills of local managers and elected leaders can thus signifi cantly infl uence social safety net programs. If local managers understand the objectives of the program and are trained in leadership skills, they become more engaged. Experience with the Ethiopia PSNP shows that, for these reasons, local managers paid more attention to the technical experts who were carrying out tasks for the PSNP, such as facilitating local planning, organizing public works, and making payments. Th ey were more confi dent in encouraging their teams to embrace shared objectives and responsibilities. Th rough a sense of engagement, leaders were able to build trust within their teams. Such changes in leadership have resulted in team members performing at a higher level. In contrast, low-performing districts are more oft en characterized by new or unengaged leaders than by the quality of the skills among the technical experts.
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In many countries, informal practices infl uence the ability and willingness of staff to carry out their functions. For example, it has become common for civil servants to use the per diems associated with training, workshops, and monitoring visits to supplement their salaries. Th e implications of this per diem culture are various. Th e desire to receive a per diem may bring people together to overcome a barrier in decision making or resolve technical issues. Th e desire to collect per diems may also undermine reforms. For instance, the introduction of e-payments and electronic reporting systems may be resisted by staff if these systems reduce the need for monitoring visits by staff , which enable them to draw per diems. In some countries, informal networks and personal or political connections infl uence hiring decisions within the civil service, thereby limiting the role played by technical expertise and merit and resulting in suboptimal program staffi ng.
Notes
9. For example, Olivier de Sardan (2013) explains that, in West Africa, civil servants and local administrators are oft en focused on gaining formal or informal access to development aid. 10. Th e OVC Program was run by the Department of Children's Services, while the cash transfer programs for older persons and persons with severe disabilities were run by the Department of Social Development. 11. Deconcentration tends to involve only the delegation of certain tasks and decisions, though the upward accountability to supervising ministries tends to take precedence over any local accountability. Decentralization includes the relinquishment of power by the central government to actors at a lower level in a political-administrative hierarchy. At a minimum, it devolves substantial decision-making powers to locally representative bodies, but it may also include the decentralization of fi scal resources and revenue-generating powers. One type of decentralization is delegation, whereby responsibility for decision making and the administration of public functions are transferred to semiautonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it, such as public enterprises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation authorities, and semiautonomous school districts. See Ribot (2002) . 12. Personal communication, Paul Derksin, August 2017.
